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Coalition of the Spending (New Government 
First Steps) 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
The constellation after elections 
In the previous issue of this bulletin I shared 
some expectations the proved wrong. 
Immediately after elections I expected a tacit 
coalition led by Socialists (BSP). Now there is 
an open coalition in place, consisting of BSP, 
the King’s party (National Movement Simeon 
the Second, NMSS) and the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) and sealed by a 
coalition agreement. It took six-seven weeks of 
tricky talks to reach an agreement to form an 
executive with MRF mandate after two 
consecutive failures of BSP and NMSS to recruit 
sufficient support.1 The outcome, however, is a 
legislative majority of 2/3 of the seats, sufficient 
to amend the constitution if needed.2 
Also, I expected a slow down in GDP growth. 
For the time being, however, all data 
demonstrate a rate of plus 6% y/y in the second 
quarter. There was a delay in privatization but 
elections had an impact of Christmas in the 
summer, stepped up public procurement and 
increased investment by private sector on 
projects launched last year and in the first 
                                                 
1 The constitution gives an opportunity to make three 
attempts to form a cabinet after a change in the 
government. 
2 It might be the case with reforming judiciary to meet EU 
accession requirements, particularly in terms of abolishing 
the immunity of magistrates and prosecutors. 
quarter. The take off of the tourist season (May 
and June) was strong and by end August the 
number of visitors went up by 18% compared to 
the same period last year. Central bank 
restriction on credit (effective since April) and 
increased oil prices should have a delayed and 
somewhat insignificant impact this year. 
Consumption and investment are still strong. 
The economic growth and other factors resulted, 
by the end of the second quarter in a budget 
surplus of 2.65%.  
The composition 
There was no such broad ruling coalition in the 
last fifteen years. In general coalition has been 
difficult uniting either center-right (1991-1992, 
1997-2001, 2001-2005) or center left (1994-
1997) like minded political groupings. Only the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF, the 
party Bulgaria Muslims vote for) had 
demonstrated inclinations to join either center 
when necessary. MRF is a member of the so-
called Liberal International, the global group of 
centrist and reformist politicians and parties but 
its political leaning in Bulgaria context is more 
to the left. Now the government is built on the 
MRF mandate. In the period between late June – 
end August, all other parties had failed to set a 
workable executive. The coalition members are 
MRF, the ex-communist Bulgaria Socialist Party 
(BSP) and the National Movement Simeon the 
Second (NMSS, the ex-king-PM’s party, also a 
member of the Liberal International). 
The only past precedent of a similar left-left 
coalition was the Fatherland Front of September 
1944, which was established with the help of the 
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Soviet army, extinguished the non-cooperative 
opposition and expelled than the boy-king 
Simeon. Foreigners would not know and 
Bulgarians could have already forgotten that the 
Fatherland Front was the constitutional chirm of 
the Communist rule until 10 November 1989 
and the formal government change after the first 
multi-party elections of June 1990. 
This historic connotation is not suggesting any 
peculiar treat for the country in the coming 
years. It simply reveals a reputation shortage of 
the incumbent government, which could play a 
creative role: presumably, the coalition member 
would undertake no policy that could bring 
about restoration of communist political habits 
or signs of it. Although, as we will see below, 
the leftist agenda is already dominating 
initiatives in the economic area. 
The composition of government offices has been 
agreed under the following scheme of 
distribution of the seats in the executive: 
8(BSP): 5(NMSS): 3(MRF), and the scheme 
penetrates all layers of government, including 
appointees on district and central representatives 
on local level. 
The overall division of labor is the following: 
• BSP, securing the prime-ministership for its 
leader, Mr. Stanishev, controls the most 
spending and key economic ministries, i.e. 
those of foreign affairs, the interior, 
economy and energy (united in one), 
transport, labor, healthcare, culture and 
housing; 
• NMSS, controls most of the bureaucracy via 
the ministries of state administration, 
justice, defense, EU integration; 
• MRF controls the least accountable 
spending of EU funds and subsidies via the 
ministries of agriculture, environment and 
emergency situations – one of the best 
funded bodies with loose pockets. 
The minister of finance, Mr. Plamen Oresharski, 
is independent. He is a former deputy minister of 
finance in the Kostov cabinet of the United 
Democratic Forces (UDF, 1997-2001) and was 
responsible for managing the government debt. 
His only political backing is Mr. Stanishev; the 
finance minister reports directly to him. 
Above the coalition is the Coalition Council, 
informal Polit-Bureau-like structure, where party 
leaders deliberate key policies and personnel 
issues. Taking into account this background, I 
can name the ruling structure and “Coalition of 
the Spending”. 
What is the government up to? 
The PM and the coalition’s statement of intent 
claim this government is one of “European 
Integration, Economic Growth and Social 
Responsibility”. 
There is little imagination and room to maneuver 
in the policy area of EU accession. (see the 
special section on EU Bulgaria relations.) The 
economic growth is a non-trivial task when a 
country runs, as it is the case of Bulgaria in 
2005, at 5.5-6% annual real GDP rate, has a 
generous (at 16% of GDP budget expenditures) 
social welfare, the government spends 42-43% 
of GDP, the folks are old (the dependency ratio 
is 1:1), but nobody intends to reduce the fiscal 
burden. 
The first three month of government operation is 
characteristic with the following: 
• The new coalition inherited a luxurious 
budget surplus of 2.7% of GDP by the third 
quarter of the year; half of it was agreed 
with IMF to be saved as surplus by the year 
end. It is not yet clear (the report on fiscal 
performance is available at the day of this 
publication), but it seems that the line 
ministries have spent more than agreed 
upon. Last week of October the IMF 
mission left without approval of the next 
year fiscal outlook.3 Part of the spending 
zeal has been justified by summer floods 
and other emergency needs but that’s not the 
whole story 
• Due to the government composition the 
number of government employees increased 
by at least 10%; the exact figure will be 
known later. 
• Privatization, although almost completed 
with few remaining monopolies (gas, power 
and tobacco), has been virtually stopped: 
some privatization deals of the previous 
government (a power station, ports and 
airports on the sea coast, harboring the bulk 
of the charter traffic) have ended up in the 
courts and there is no clear message how the 
government intends to handle the entire 
issue. It is likely that the power station in 
the Black Sea port of Varna will be sold to 
Russian RAO Energy. 
                                                 
3 See below the paragraph on the talks with IMF. 
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• Lack of liberalization in the production and 
international and internal trade of electricity 
created a conflict with already privatized 
electricity distribution stations. It has been 
resolved by increasing the price of industrial 
consumers by 16% while prices for 
households remained unchanged. The 
ancient public heating system, centralized in 
a Soviet manner in 1950’s, has been a joke 
for years. Lifting its subsidies has been 
postponed by previous government and had 
to be implemented by the incumbents. 
• Big government deals like granting EURO 
740 million highway concession on a non-
competitive basis and building a second 
nuclear power station were nominally put on 
hold but, in fact, the government relies on 
the society’s ability to forget, in the first 
case, while it is stubbornly working on the 
nuclear deal, which will cost EURO 2.1 
million. 
In this situation it was almost a miracle that the 
finance minister managed to compile and submit 
on time, few hours before the deadline,4 the 
2006 budget before the legislature. The fiscal 
outlook is the following: 
• The budget is balanced, although IMF 
insisted on a planed surplus of about 1.5% 
of GDP. The envisaged important 
parameters are: economic growth is 5.5% of 
GDP, annual inflation – 5.8%, the exchange 
rate to the dollar is BGN 1.61, and petrol 
price is 61.4 per barrel. 
• There is a plan for less revenue from direct 
taxation. The lower tax threshold has been 
lifted from 10% to 20%, while upper 
threshold is 25%. All excise duties are to be 
lifted to the minimum EU level from 
January 1, 2006. The idea is allow the 
inflation to hit next year and secure the 
prospect to join the EMU by the end of 
2009. The provisional tax burden will be 
increased by 0.6-0.7% of GDP in absolute 
terms. 
• One of the reasons for this situation is the 
idea to finance state pensions with tax 
revenues. Social welfare taxes have been 
lowered by 6% (from as high as 41.5%), due 
to decreased employers’ pension 
contributions but the pay-as-you-go system 
remains unreformed – the system’s 
expenditures will be finances by other tax 
                                                 
4 By law, the deadline is October 31. 
revenues and quasi-fiscal government 
income (25% of privatization proceeds and 
50% of the money saved through improving 
administrative efficiency). The expected 
figures are not named at all but the budget 
law prohibits line ministers spending excess 
revenues (thus hinting that currently there is 
a problem of overspending). 
• Eventually, the social welfare (pensions and 
mandated labor and other benefits) will 
consume 18.5% of GDP. The next most 
money wasting sectors – public healthcare 
and education – remain unreformed and 
fiscally tolerated against private alternatives. 
IMF talks 
There is a serious risk that the stand-by 
agreement would not be reconfirmed. There two 
key disagreements. 
• The first is the spending pace in the recent 
months. The situation is basically very 
simple. The first move of the finance 
minister, Mr. Oresharski, was to push for an 
amendment of the budget compilation law 
that requires budget surplus above 1.5% of 
GDP to be spent upon parliamentary 
approval. Legislators voted the amendment 
promptly but the spending ministers acted 
faster. 
• The second issue is more complicated. IMF 
is worried by the fact that the current 
account deficit grew unexpectedly from 7.6 
to 13.3% of GDP. If investment ceases 
coming in from abroad there is a probability 
of an external shock, argued IMF. Given the 
failure of central bank administrative 
measures to cool down credit growth (of 
roughly 30% per annum)5, IMF did not find 
any other instrument at hand besides 
pressing a fiscal break, i.e. keeping taxes 
high and refrain from spending. The 
government was not very open what 
argument they used in the talks, but 
obviously it insisted on not cutting the 
expenditures and referred to the common 
practice of combined current account and 
(sizable) fiscal deficits in EU, including 
2004 members before accession. 
                                                 
5 IMF interpreted the widening of the current account 
deficit as stemming from consumer credit expansion, and 
these very policies (raising minimum reserve requirement, 
application of credits ceilings) were inspired by IMF and 
implemented by central bank in the first quarter of 2005. 
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The Bulgarian economist community (besides 
few exceptions) expressed the following 
arguments against IMF views: 
1. imports are due to investment and embrace 
mostly investment goods (a process that is 
natural given the record high FDI of over 
EURO 2 billion in 2004); export grows, 
fiscal reserves have double the amount need, 
credit expansion, although unexpected, does 
not signal accumulation of non-performing 
loans and if there signs of risky behavior the 
central bank should punish the wrong-doers; 
2. the fiscal constellation with huge surpluses 
is more risky for the current account deficit 
because the spending pattern of the left-
minded government is to finance 
consumption of non-productive populace 
after taxing productive folks; 
3. if Bulgaria is to enter EU in 2007, the 
external balance would become somewhat 
artificial macroeconomic indicator; there is 
little provided there is no theory to advice 
what kind (what amount) of surplus could 
cure the current account problem but it is 
likely that taxes could discourage savings 
and encourage evasion (which is anyway 
twice the EU average), and, lastly, the hope 
is that Bulgaria would continue to attract 
foreign saving as it was the case with new 
EU entrants. 
I think that the current constellation is due to 
historic factors (delayed consumption and 
investment, late bank reforms, and generous 
welfare state) that are hardly manageable by any 
of the policies discussed. A provisional healthy 
policy mix could include simultaneous reforms 
in pensions and healthcare to provide for 
individual accounts and savings, lowering 
government expenditures and direct taxes (while 
keeping the level of indirect ones), accountable 
public procurement and information sharing 
between banks. Unfortunately, none of these is 
entirely in the IMF policy arsenal (of a stand-by 
agreement) and government is reluctant even to 
think in this direction. The incapacity is, to 
extend, due to the long cooperation with IMF; its 
role in Bulgaria was fairy positive but 
diminished the ability of Bulgarian 
establishment to think on its own. 
EU prospects 
On October 25 the European Commission 
presented its Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive 
Monitoring Report. The key points of the report 
are relative well-known, I would comment only 
on the prospect to meet EU requirement in due 
time, i.e. by early spring next year. The most 
difficult issues to resolve are the following: 
1. Organized crime. The issue is really serious 
one, not so much because of the size of the 
black economy but because of the 
uncertainty it nourishes. The roots of 
Bulgaria problems are in: a) the ineffective 
prosecution, which plays its own 
independent game, not reporting to anyone 
and protected by immunity; b) the immunity 
itself is broadly defined and widely applied 
(to all magistrates, top public servant and 
members of parliament); c) there was little 
or ineffective (those fired started 
“businesses”) cleaning up of the ex-
communist structures of the ministry of 
interior, limited or no publicity of their 
operations, and all attempts to open archives 
of the Bulgarian analogues of KGB were 
blocked, including form the previous 
government; and d) there is little 
coordination and much competition between 
different law enforcement bodies, the basic 
level of skills is very low, and for fifteen 
years of reforms there was only one minister 
who fit the task. All these are impossible to 
resolve in a year or so. The incumbent 
minister is far from capable of making a 
difference. On the top of all these – there is 
no “EU model” to follow. What will be 
done? The parliament already voted the 
penal procedure code where most EU 
requirements are implemented on paper. 
The government has drafted a constitutional 
amendment to lift the immunity. Since there 
is no universal standard, the cabinet is trying 
to demonstrate successes in fighting crime. 
Those would be difficult to prove. 
2. Related to the above point is corruption. It 
impact on the local economy is most 
probably bigger than black (organized 
crime) market. The problem is that for year 
the lack of accountability has been used to 
finance political parties, i.e. the very 
Bulgarian democracy. Political leaders have 
shown no will and personal example to deal 
with the issue; the previous government 
even stated its mandate with a session on 
how to avoid the requirement of the public 
procurement law. Foreign governments and 
EU itself eagerly financed expensive anti-
corruption fighting project thus crowding 
out grass-root efforts to finds answers to 
simple questions, like: “who got that public 
procurement auction and why”, “how much 
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the government costs”, “why customs do not 
function” and the like. Last but not least, 
small fishes were sometimes persecuted but 
not the big ones. The government will try to 
demonstrate resolve and boldness on this 
front and it is likely that it will manage to 
improve its accountability and publicity. 
Otherwise, it will become unmanageable. 
Part of the problem is linked to the fact that 
there are two types of inefficiency built one 
onto another, the EU and Bulgaria one. It 
seems that it will take time to reconcile 
those and the country will not use the 
subsidies that are made available for the pre-
and-post-accession period. 
3. In this regard, there number of technical 
issues (CAP related filing and statistics, 
sanitary and environmental controls, copy-
right databases and enforcement), which 
will be fulfilled on time but with a 
significant delay in the administrative and 
provisional beneficiaries’ capacity to utilize 
subsidies. 
It seems that Bulgaria will join EU in 2007, 
resembling Greece at the day of accession with 
less cash available from Brussels. 
Instead of conclusion 
At the end of October I stroke 50, and a friend 
from Britain made me a valuable present – a 
book by Frank Fox title “Bulgaria” and 
published in London by A. & C. Black Ltd 90 
years ago, on the aftermath of the Balkan wars 
and the first year of World War One. The last 
sentence of that book is very epilogue for the 
end of 2005: “Simple, laborious, religious, 
frugal, they [Bulgarian peasants] deserve better 
than to be food for powder” (Frank Fox, Bulgaria, 
London, A. & C. Black Ltd, 1915, p.206.). 
 
 
Plan B – Effects of the Eventual Delay of 
Bulgaria’s Joining the EU6 
Georgi Angelov, Svetla Kostadinova, Dimitar 
Chobanov 
 
Accession treaty art. (39): 
If, on the basis of the Commission's continuous 
monitoring of commitments undertaken by 
Bulgaria and Romania in the context of the 
accession negotiations and in particular the 
Commission's monitoring reports, there is clear 
evidence that the state of preparations for 
adoption and implementation of the acquis in 
Bulgaria or Romania is such that there is a 
serious risk of either of those States being 
manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements 
of membership by the date of accession of 1 
January 2007 in a number of important areas, 
the Council may, acting unanimously on the 
basis of a Commission recommendation, decide 
that the date of accession of that State is 
postponed by one year to 1 January 2008. 
 
The European Union as a reform stimulator 
Most of the economic reforms in Bulgaria have 
been made not because of the inner confidence 
                                                 
6 The article is published for the first time in the “Policies” 
magazine of the “Open society” Institute - Sofia  
(http://politiki.osf.bg), issue. 24, 18.07.2005. 
of the people who carried them out, but due to 
the outer pressure mainly from international 
financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Their basic 
medium of forcing the government to carry out 
reforms was the so crucial to the financial and 
macroeconomic stability of the country. 
However, as time has passed, the importance of 
the funding from international financial 
institutions began to decrease, and so did the 
ability of the IMF and the World Bank to 
provoke reforms in Bulgaria. 
Gradually the EU took the place of the IMF and 
the World Bank as a reform stimulator, and part 
of the more recent reforms have been made 
under its pressure. The willingness of the 
Bulgarian people and politicians for Bulgaria to 
become member of EU, gave the EU the power 
to push the reform process. The problem is that 
the more certain Bulgaria’s EU membership 
becomes, the less influence on reforms the EU 
has. When a certain country becomes a member 
of the EU, the inner consensus necessary for the 
reforming process disappears, along with the 
purpose of the reforms –EU-accession. 
Using the preventive clause, the EU tries to 
solve this problem, stimulating Bulgaria and 
Romania to continue their reforms. This clause 
keeps both countries in check and prevents them 
from thinking that they are already members of 
the EU and that there is no need to change any 
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more. It turned out that the lack of inner 
confidence in the Bulgarian society, concerning 
the necessity of the reforms, should be 
compensated by outer pressure. In that case the 
preventive clause (especially if it urges forward 
the reforming process without coming into 
power) could have a good effect on the country. 
But it’s coming into power will have both 
positive (reform stimulation) and negative 
effects such as the inability to profit by the 
advantages which an eventual EU membership 
would give and of course the risk of further 
postponement. 
Free migration 
Free movement of people inside the EU is one of 
the biggest advantages that EU membership can 
give to a country. Unfortunately, the economic 
problems in some European countries which are 
members of the EU led to restrictions in 
migration for new member countries from the 
former Soviet Union. Despite this, three of the 
old members (Ireland, Great Britain and 
Sweden) and two of the new ones (Malta and 
Cyprus) apply the free movement principle 
towards all member countries and will probably 
apply it towards Bulgaria after its EU accession. 
Free movement of people ensures competition 
on the labor market, with all of its advantages. 
On a limited national labor market it is more 
possible that a shortage of certain types of labor 
occurs, with the resulting problems to the 
economy following it, compared to an opened 
international labor market. Besides citizens of a 
certain country have the opportunity to gain 
know-how and experience in a foreign land and 
later apply it in their motherland (provided that a 
suitable business environment exists). Also 
important is the fact that part of the money 
earned by Bulgarian emigrants is a sizable and 
steadily increasing income for their families 
back home, forming national income bigger than 
the educational and the healthcare budget of the 
country. 
Postponing the accession of Bulgaria to the EU 
will lead to a decrease in the opportunity for 
Bulgarian workers to work legally abroad in 
countries that do not hinder free migration. This 
means that many people will continue to work 
illegally abroad or will try to emigrate illegally, 
thus increasing expenses. 
Not joining the EU will definitely have a 
negative impact on free people movement in 
Bulgaria. It will be cushioned by the fact that 
many countries do not admit workers from 
former Soviet Union countries to their labor 
market. The only adequate response politicians 
in Bulgaria could give to this situation is to 
create а business-friendly environment, thus 
stimulating the opening of well paid working 
places. This will, to a certain extent, reduce the 
negative effect of an EU-accession delay. 
European funds 
Expected funds after joining the EU: 
Financial package 2007 – 2009 
Mln. Euro (in 2004 prices) 2007 2008 2009 
Structural reforms 539 759 1 002 
Agricultural development 183 244 306 
Provisional Instrument for facilitation of the cash flows and 
assistance of the Shengen agreement’s realization  121.8 59.1 58.6 
Nuclear energy safety7  70 70 70 
Total  804.8 1 132.1 1 436.6 
Source: Bulgaria and Romania accession treaty; Report on the results of Bulgaria and Romania accession 
negotiations. 
                                                 
7 During the period between 2007 - 2009 the EU grants Bulgaria financial help, supporting the country’s efforts to put out of 
operation and undertake measures to overcome the consequences of shutting down the nuclear reactors 1 to 4 of the “Kozlodui” 
nuclear power-plant. 
Bulgaria’s payments 
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1) Since the date of their accession 
Bulgaria and Romania pay the following 
sums, according to their share capital, 
carried in for the registered capital, 
defined in art. (4) from the By- laws of 
the European  Investment Bank 8. 
 
Bulgaria EUR   14 800 000  
Romania EUR  42 300 000  
These sums are paid in eight equal installments 
maturing on 31.05.2007, 31.05.2008, 
31.05.2009, 30.11.2009, 31.05.2010, 
30.11.2010, 31.05.2011 and 30.11.2011. 
2) Payment for the EU budget – 1.24% of GDP. 
 
Utilization of European funds 
Disadvantages: 
• Lack of experience and preparation for 
using the EU funds – most probably in the 
first years the money for agricultural 
development will be inefficiently spent 
(for creating governing administrative 
structures for example and not for helping 
growers) 
• Change in motive of entrepreneurs – they 
are attracted to the funded business 
spheres, not because of the opportunity to 
do business more cheaply, but only to take 
advantage of the funds. 
• The increase in government 
administration, needed for assimilating 
funds, will lead to an increase in 
government spending and in corruption 
risk. 
• One of the basic requirements for 
receiving EU funds is co-financing from 
the state budget (at least 25%). On the one 
hand, this means that part of the 
taxpayers’ money will be spent on 
financing different society groups. On the 
other hand, according to Ministry of 
Finance data, it is apparent that despite the 
increase in assimilation percentage EU 
funds are not completely utilized. 
Financial assimilation of pre-accession 
programs 
                                                 
8 The mentioned figures are indicative and are based on 
2003 data, published by Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sour
ce: 
Ministry of finance, financial assimilation of   pre-
accession programs, selected periods 
 
Advantages: 
• The eventual introduction and use of 
new technologies will increase 
productivity of labor, which is lower 
than the EU average, especially in 
agriculture. 
As a conclusion, we can summarize – the 
expected EU funding for the year 2007, which 
comes up to 804.8 mln. EUR (1573.6 mln. 
BGN), will be spent on different society groups. 
If we take the 2004 state budget over fulfillment 
data into consideration (1500 mln. BGN), we 
can expect that in 2005 it will be at least 1000-
1500 mln. BGN. In that case, it is completely 
possible that Bulgaria could continue its reforms 
without European funding. In order for the 
country to sustain its rate of economic growth it 
is necessary (and feasible) that the overall tax 
burden would be reduced. Thus the effect will be 
enhanced, no unnecessary expenses and increase 
in government administration will be made, 
entrepreneurship and employment will be 
stimulated. 
Trade 
Free movement of goods, as far as it is not 
hindered as migration, is an extremely important 
advantage following from the EU membership. 
It eliminates possible monopolies on the 
domestic market already existing in Bulgaria, 
due to import limitations on certain 
commodities. At the same time, it eases the 
export of domestic products, most of all 
agricultural ones, which are currently not freely 
traded. From this point of view, the eventual 
delay of Bulgaria’s EU accession will slow 
down the process of integration of the country’s 
economy to the world economy and will result 
in an inability to fully take advantage of labor 
division. 
Investment 
 ISPA SAPARD RHARE 
2003 
May 2004 16.41% 16.29% 18.51% 
December 
2004 
29.13% 40.95% 56.29% 
May 2005 41.12% n.a 62.58% 
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Postponement of the EU accession is the topic 
considered to be fundamental before the general 
elections in Bulgaria. It is presented only as 
harmful to the economy, considering the benefits 
from joining the EU. But there are certain 
negative effects of the EU membership, which 
should also be taken into consideration. 
The accession to the EU means that the 
harmonization between Bulgarian and European 
legislation is complete and some regulations that 
are not necessarily good for the business are 
approved. During the process of integration, part 
of the legislation was adopted without 
evaluating its effect on Bulgarian companies. 
The principle in the EU when proposing new 
regulations or altering old ones, is to evaluate 
their effect by making a cost-benefit analysis. 
Thus the new regulation is approved only if the 
benefits exceed the costs. The Bulgarian 
government however did not respect this 
principle, because it hurried to close the 
negotiation chapters (claiming the political 
benefits from it), ignoring the fact that the 
acquiring of its short-term aim might be in 
contradiction with the interests of many 
Bulgarian firms and citizens. 
Thus, many impediments for the domestic 
companies are created, because they are 
compelled to obey certain standards before the 
country joins the EU. This would provoke 
particularly large expenses for the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and may cause their 
bankruptcy. A one-year delay of the EU 
membership could give them enough time to 
prepare and avoid bankruptcy. Some of them 
however won’t be able tо persist, even under 
these conditions, because the investment needed 
is too large to fund. Therefore the postponement 
will keep them artificially on the market for one 
more year, preventing them from relocating their 
resources into more profitable areas i.e. we can 
expect negative impact on economic efficiency 
as a result of the delay. 
The net effect from the two opposite actions can 
hardly be measured, but what we can expect is 
the crash of some companies, reduction of 
employment and income of the people who work 
there. On the other hand, the firms which 
survive will have better access to European and 
international markets. They will have the 
opportunity to export most of their production 
and increase profits. 
Another aspect of the preventive clause is its 
impact on investment in the country. Investment 
is to a great extent influenced by the elected 
government and by the policy it pursues during 
its mandate. The acceptance of Bulgaria in the 
EU is a powerful stimulant to investors and the 
essential fact is that that whether in 2007 or 
2008, Bulgaria will become a member. 
Nevertheless, the investors will consider the 
postponement a bad sign. It is crucial that the 
necessary reforms in administration and the 
judiciary system are undertaken in order to 
reduce corruption, which is considered to be the 
main barrier for investment. Also important is 
the improvement in protecting private property, 
which guarantees risk-takers reward for their 
efforts. 
Bulgaria could compensate the eventual negative 
effect, by improving the rest of the factors 
influencing over investment. One of these 
factors is taxation, and a lot can be done to 
reduce the tax-welfare burden. But failing in 
changing that, may lead to a further fall behind 
of Bulgaria, in compare to its competitors, which 
are already in the EU, namely Estonia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia. 
Another possible unfavorable effect on incoming 
cash flow in 2007 could be the eventual raise of 
interest rates by the European Central Bank. 
Currently they are at a very low level, which 
makes investment in EU countries unprofitable. 
Therefore, part of the investments are re-directed 
to countries like Bulgaria. If the ECB raises the 
interest rates, combined with the eventual 
coming into power of the preventive clause and 
the slowing down of the privatization process, 
this may lead to a decrease in foreign 
investment. In general, this will affect the 
country’s rate of economic growth and the 
opening of new working places. 
Adoption of the European currency 
The postponement of Bulgaria’s EU-
membership will have a direct effect on the 
adoption of the euro as a legal means of 
exchange (eurozation) in the Bulgarian 
economy. The eurozation has several positive 
effects. One of them is the abolition of the 
insurance premium on European and Bulgarian 
currency deposits. This premium consists of 
lower interest rates on credits, granted by credit 
institutions, when denominating EUR to BGN, 
which raises the expenses for funding Bulgarian 
currency. Besides, the adoption of the Euro will 
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reduce the possibility of a currency or a bank 
crisis. The Euro is a powerful stimulant to trade 
and tourism within the limits of the EU, 
significantly reducing transaction costs and 
provides the ability to easier compare prices of 
goods and services in the Euro zone. 
EU-membership and compliance with the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 are indispensable 
conditions for adopting the Euro. According to 
the ERM 2 several criteria must be fulfilled. 
Some of them (budget deficit, government debt, 
exchange rate and yield of government 
securities) are already achieved, but the main 
challenge remains inflation. Inflation must be 
kept under 3.5% for two successive years (2007 
and 2008), which is hardly feasible, considering 
its rate after the currency board was brought in. 
Therefore, delaying Bulgaria’s EU accession 
will inflict many losses in this direction. 
Instead of a conclusion 
Generally, the delay of Bulgaria’s accession to 
the EU would have a mixed impact on the 
economy. However, the country’s economic 
development depends chiefly on the internal 
economic policy. No matter when Bulgaria 
actually joins the EU the economic results 
achieved by the country’s economy (good or 
bad) are consequences solely from the policy of 
the government and are its responsibility. If the 
government is open enough to reforms, there 
will be no reason for us to expect postponement 
of Bulgaria’s EU-membership, and even if that 
happens it won’t cause much trouble. If not, then 
substantial economic problems can be expected, 
independent from the year of accession. 
 
 
7 June - The Day When Bulgarians Stopped 
Working for the Government 
Adriana Mladenova, Veliko Dimitrov 
 
According to calculations of the Institute of 
Market Economics this year the Bulgarian 
citizens stopped working for the government and 
begun working for themselves on 7 June 2005. 
Taken figuratively, if the whole income of 
people was being used first to cover the annual 
government revenues, the government would 
take all earnings of every citizen till day 158 of 
the year or 7 June 2005 and only after this date 
people would begin working and earning for 
themselves. We have called this date 
Government Freedom Day by analogy with Tax 
Freedom Date, which is calculated by the 
Canadian Fraser Institute and American Cato 
Institute. By this imaginary exercise we aim to 
present the role of the government in the process 
of redistribution of income of the citizens. 
The methodology of calculation of this peculiar 
Freedom Day is as follows: based on the forecast 
of GDP in Bulgaria for 2005 we calculate the 
average aggregate income per day earned by the 
Bulgarian economy. The average income per 
day amounts to 114 million levs. According to 
IME forecast, the government revenues in 2005 
will pass 18 billion levs. Dividing the revenues 
by the average income per day we get the 
number of days in which the citizens should 
work in order to earn the government revenues. 
The government coercively takes these resources 
from people and supplies public goods in return 
– state health services, education, etc. 
Of course this is just a simplified and 
standardized example and for each person this 
day varies according to the level of income 
earned and the share of it that is being taken 
away through taxes, fees and other fiscal 
burdens. You can compute for each single 
person the exact day he or she stops working for 
the government and starts working for 
himself/herself and his/her family. 
We have used the methodology described above 
to compare Bulgaria with other countries. 
Results are shown in the table below.  
 
Table: Comparison with other countries* 
Country Real GDP growth (%) 
Days working for 
government 
Lithuania 7.0 122 
Latvia 8.3 132 
Estonia 7.8 137 
Bulgaria 5.6 152 
Germany 1.6 171 
Italy 1.2 177 
France 2.3 199 
Sources: Eurostat; Ministry of Finance of The 
Republic of Bulgaria; own calculations 
* Data for 2004 
 
 
 Economic Policy Review, issue 33, June - October 2005 
10
The correlation between the level of economic 
growth and number of days working for the 
government is obvious: the less time working for 
the government, the higher the economic 
growth. Reducing the share of redistribution by 
authorities will result in higher disposable 
income for people, which will definitely lead to 
stronger incentives for them to work and 
rediscover the spirit of entrepreneurship that are 
the main engines of economic growth. 
 
 
Economic Migration – European Practices9 
Georgi Angelov 
 
Very often when migration is mentioned the 
attitude is negative. In the countries that people 
leave the talk is of “melting of the nation” and 
“brain drain”. In the countries where people 
migrate, allegations emerge that immigrants 
increase levels of criminality, etc. In most cases, 
these allegations are groundless and cover 
internal problems of the respective country. It is 
always easier to accuse those who leave or those 
who arrive in the country for some problem than 
to make efforts to cope with its causes. 
However, migration is rather a natural 
phenomenon than problem or unusual event. 
People have always migrated – from rural 
toward industrial regions, from villages to cities, 
from high unemployment to low unemployment 
places. When this migration is international 
there are more barriers for passing – in some 
countries there exist barriers for leaving the 
country, in most countries the barriers are 
against foreigners that settle down in the 
country. 
Exit barriers are a trademark of unfree countries 
and they are perceived as inconsistent with the 
principles of the liberal democracies-this 
question is settled. Entry barriers are perceived 
as needed. However, what must be the type and 
design of these barriers is a highly debatable 
question, which is resolved in different ways and 
with different success in the individual 
countries. 
The differences in migration policies between 
the individual countries in the EU and the 
candidate countries are the reason for the 
European Commission to organize discussion 
and exchange of experience on the issue. In this 
discussion the main role was given to the 
experience of Ireland, because in the recent 
years its market-oriented migration policy 
established as one of the leading practices in 
Europe. 
                                                 
9 The article is published in “Capital” weekly, 29/July 2005 
What is the Irish migration policy? 
The Irish policy on economic migration is based 
on the economic needs of the country, 
addressing deficits of labour resources and 
skills. The main characteristic of the policy is 
that it is based on the market signals and it 
doesn’t depend on the evaluation and discretion 
of the administration. This makes the system 
extremely flexible and effective. 
In respect to the EU member states Ireland does 
not apply any restrictions, i.e. every citizen of 
the 25 EU countries plus the countries from the 
European Economic Area can settle in Ireland 
and work there. The main tool of the Irish 
migration policy in respect to the countries 
outside the European Economic Area is the 
system of work permits. 
The work permits system is based on the 
existence of job vacancies that cannot be filled 
from the European Economic Area. In order to 
prove the need for hiring a foreigner, the 
employers must advertise the vacancy with the 
National Employment and Training Agency and 
after one month passes without finding local 
candidates they can offer the job to a foreigner. 
The work permits are issued to the employer for 
a specific employee and for a specific 
workplace. However, in most cases it is possible 
for an employee to change his workplace as the 
new employer receives a new work permit. In 
short, the basis of the Irish policy is that the 
market and the availability of job vacancies 
determine whether work permits will be issued 
for immigrants from the countries outside the 
European Economic Area, i.e., for people from 
within the area no permits are required. 
As a result of the fast economic growth in 
Ireland, more comparatively high paid jobs are 
being created in recent years. Local people 
cannot fill them because there is no 
unemployment in the country already (see table). 
As a result for the last five years more than 
150,000 people joined the labour market in the 
country. They contribute to the increase of the 
economic growth and rise of prosperity of 
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Ireland, which is already the second wealthiest 
country in the European Union (only 
Luxemburg ranks before Ireland). According to 
some studies the inflow of emmigrants increases 
the GDP growth by 3-4 percent per annum.
Ireland’s Labour and Migratory Experience 1994 to 2004 
 Labour Force Employment UE Rate Inflows Outflows Net migration 
 000s 000s % 000s 000s 000s 
1994 1431.6 1220.6 14.7 30.1 34.8 -4.7 
1995 1459.2 1281.7 12.2 31.2 33.1 -1.9 
1996 1507.5 1328.5 11.9 39.2 31.2 8 
1997 1539 1379.9 10.3 44.5 25.3 19.2 
1998 1620.4 1494 7.8 46 28.6 17.4 
1999 1685.9 1589.1 5.7 48.9 31.5 17.4 
2000 1745.9 1671.4 4.4 52.6 26.6 26 
2001 1787 1721.9 3.6 59 26.2 32.8 
2002 1840.9 1763.9 4.2 66.9 25.6 41.3 
2003 1875.5 1793.4 4.4 50.5 20.7 29.8 
2004 1920.3 1836.2 4.4 50.1 18.5 31.6 
Source: Alan Barrett, Ireland: Increasing Labour Supply through Immigration, Economic and Social 
Research Institute, 2005 
 
The experience of other countries 
Bulgaria adopted by and large the Irish model 
in respect to the work permits. Here they are 
similarly issued by request of the employer if 
there are no Bulgarian citizens that can fill the 
job vacancy. The problem of Bulgaria is the high 
unemployment, the slow growth of labor 
demand and low wages that don’t stimulate 
foreign citizens to work in the country. 
Therefore, Bulgaria must first become a rich 
country and only after that foreigners will be 
attracted here by economic reasons. 
As far as our country is poor, the process of 
migration will be directed outward, toward 
emigration of Bulgarian citizens in more 
advanced countries. That is not necessarily a 
negative development, because through 
emigration these people receive many skills, 
which later on can be applied in Bulgaria (if 
appropriate conditions exist) and can support its 
development. The emigrants are also sending 
their relatives considerable resources, which is 
one large source of funds to the country. 
Most of the countries of the European Union 
apply more regulated, administrative system for 
accepting economic migrants. 
Austria accepts migrants on the basis of a quota, 
determined annually as a percentage of the labor 
potential of the country and the individual 
regions. The need for workers is assessed by the 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research. 
Separately, the so-called “key workers” can 
receive work permits on the basis of a separate 
quota – that is a system for attracting highly 
educated people. In order to receive a permanent 
work permit the economic migrant in Austria 
must have five years of legal stay in the country 
(one year with an employment license and twice 
two years with an individual work permit). As a 
whole, the Austrian system is quite complicated, 
permits considerable administrative discretion 
and has many requirements. Thu is why the 
country cannot attract enough migrants, 
including the highly educated.  
A similar system is applied in Portugal. The 
decision whether and how many migrants to be 
accepted in the country is taken by the 
administration on the basis of its estimate of the 
needs on the labor market. Then a corresponding 
annual quota is determined. In reality, however, 
if the shadow sector is included, the inflow of 
migrants is twice as big as the people granted 
work permits (mostly from former colonies and 
Eastern Europe). The system for limiting 
immigration does not work as intended because 
of the impossibility of its practical application. 
The migration policy of Cyprus is most 
interesting. It is based entirely on the logic that 
workers receive temporary work permits. After 
the expiration of the permit the worker must 
leave. In distinction to the above-mentioned 
countries, there is no system in Cyprus that 
allows acquiring of permanent work permit and 
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settling in the country. As a result, most of the 
workers that migrate to the country are low 
skilled and less educated, working on a seasonal 
and not very well paid jobs. 
Without illustrating more examples it seems that 
the market approach for attracting economic 
migration to Ireland shows the best results. 
Countries, applying more complicated, 
restrictive, administrative and discretional 
policies in this field cannot attract enough highly 
educated emigrants although they declare that as 
their goal. At the same time Ireland attracts 
considerable number of foreigners with high 
qualifications that contribute to its fast economic 
growth. 
 
 
 
Bulgaria Moves Ahead 
Yassen Halachliyski 
 
Canada’s Fraser Institute published lately his 
newest report Economic Freedom of the World. 
This is the 9th edition with data from 127 nations 
for 2003. 
The first report, published in 1996, is the result 
of a decade of research by a team including 
several Nobel Laureates and over 60 other 
leading scholars in a broad range of fields. 
Economic Freedom of the World measures the 
degree to which the policies and institutions of 
countries are supportive of economic freedom. 
The cornerstones of economic freedom are: 
• Personal choice 
• Voluntary exchange 
• Freedom to compete 
• Security of privately owned property. 
Thirty-eight components and subcomponents are 
used to construct a summary index and to 
measure the degree of economic freedom in five 
areas: 
• Size of government 
• Legal structure and protection of 
property rights 
• Access to sound money 
• International exchange 
• Regulation of credit market, labor 
market and private enterprise 
Since its first edition the index has been 
demonstrating a clear rise of economic freedom 
for the world on average. Moreover nearly 90% 
of the nations recorded an improvement in their 
economic freedom score. This clearly 
demonstrates the growth of living standards. 
According to the authors high degrees of 
economic freedom have other significant 
advantages: 
• Higher GDP per capita 
• Higher economic growth rate per capita 
• Higher employment rate 
• Longer life expectancy 
• More political rights for the citizen 
In this year’s index, Hong Kong retains the 
highest rating for economic freedom, closely 
followed by Singapore, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, and the United States. 
Bulgaria is in the middle of the ranking list. We 
share the 70th place with Nicaragua, Tanzania, 
Tunisia and Slovenia. 
Although moving some places up Bulgaria still 
shows some negative developments. Examples 
are the flexibility of the labor market, the size of 
government, especially its consumption, 
transfers and subsidies. 
 
Bulgaria falls behind with some reforms 
Size of government (4.4) – social insurance 
remains the main problem, which has not 
changed for the last editions of the index. 
Government consumption, transfers and 
subsidies also suffer decline in their evaluation. 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
(4.7) – Judicial Independence and Impartial 
Courts in Bulgaria receive the lowest evaluation 
among all the indicators of the index. 
Regulation of labor market (5.0) – minimal 
wage and low flexibility of hiring and firing are 
the main problems. 
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Positive developments in Bulgaria 
The development of the credit market (8.0) and 
the access to sound money receive the highest 
scores. This stems from the low inflation that is 
relatively stable over the years. 
Another positive change is evident in the area of 
business regulations. Starting a new business has 
become slightly easier, government bureaucracy 
consumes now less time and irregular payments 
to government officials are lower. There is still 
much more to be done in this area.
 
 
 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
Ranking 97 103 106 80 70 
Size of Government 2 .5 4 .0 4 .0 4 .6 4 .4 
Government Consumption 4 .9 6 .5 5 .2 5 .7 5 .4 
Transfers and Subsidies 2 .7 6 .6 5 .8 5 .5 5 .3 
Government Enterprises and Investment 0 .0 0 .0 2 .0 2 .0 2 .0 
Top Marginal Tax Rate  3 .0 3 .0 5 .0 5 .0 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 7 .2 5 .9 5 .4 4 .7 4 .7 
Judicial Independence   4 .2 2 .8 2 .8 
Impartial Courts  5 .3 4 .5 2 .7 2 .7 
Protection of Intellectual Property   3 .4 2 .8 3 .0 
Military Interference  7 .5 8 .3 8 .3 8 .3 
Integrity of Legal System  7 .0 6 .7 6 .7 6 .7 
Access to Sound Money 4 .4 2 .0 3 .2 8 .2 8 .8 
Growth of Money Supply 7 .4 3 .0 0 .0 7 .2 7 .2 
Inflation Variability 5 .6 0 .0 0 .0 6 .6 8 .6 
Recent Annual Inflation 4 .8 0 .0 7 .9 8 .8 9 .6 
Freedom to Own Foreign Currency 0 .0 5 .0 5 .0 10 10 
Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners 4 .3 6 .9 7 .3 6 .8 7 .3 
Taxes on International Trade 8 .4 6 .4 7 .8 7 .5 7 .4 
Regulatory Trade Barriers   6 .4 6 .4 6 .4 
Size of Trade Sector 4 .8 5 .9 7 .1 6 .6 6 .8 
Official versus Black Market Exchange Rate 0 .0 9 .0 10 10 10 
Restrictions on Capital Markets 0 .0 5 .0 5 .0 3 .7 6 .0 
Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 3 .0 4 .3 5 .4 5 .8 6 .0 
Regulation of Credit Markets 1 .7 4 .3 5 .9 7 .9 8 .1 
Private Ownership of Banks 0 .0 2 .0 8 .0 8 .0 8 .0 
Competition from Foreign Banks   5 .2 9 .0 9 .0 
Extension of Credit to Private Sector 1 .0 3 .0 7 .1 7 .3 8 .2 
Avoidance of Negative Real Interest Rates 4 .0 8 .0 4 .0 10 10 
Controls on Interest Rates   5 .3 5 .3 5 .3 
Regulation of Labor Markets   4 .9 5 .1 5 .0 
Impact of Minimum Wage   2 .6 2 .6 2 .6 
Flexibility in Hiring and Firing   4 .3 4 .6 5 .0 
Collective Bargaining   7 .9 7 .8 7 .8 
Incentives from Unemployment Benefits   6 .8 6 .8 6 .8 
Military Conscription 0 .0 1 .0 3 .0 3 .0 3 .0 
Regulation of Business   5 .4 4 .3 4 .7 
Price Controls 0 .0 4 .0 6 .0 6 .0 6 .0 
Administrative Obstacles for New Businesses   6 .1 2 .5 2 .8 
Time Spent with Government Bureaucracy   6 .0 4 .0 4 .8 
Ease of Starting a New Business   2 .5 2 .2 2 .5 
Irregular Payments to Government Officials   6 .6 6 .8 7 .5 
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Forthcoming: IME Alternative Budget 
The Institute for Market Economics is preparing its regular Alternative 2006 Government Budget with 
low taxes. It will be released on November 15, 2005 on a press conference in Sofia and will be published 
in a special issue of the IME’s Flat Tax Bulletin. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Readers of IME materials, 
 
If you would like to be a part of economic freedom dissemination in Bulgaria and the world, and help 
elaboration and advocacy of market-based solutions to challenges citizens of Bulgaria and the region face, 
you can support the Institute for Market Economics by making a donation for: 
 
1) An article – 100 BGL 
2) The new book “Low Taxes in Bulgaria” – 250 BGL 
3) IME bulletins – 500 BGL 
4) IME WebPages - www.easibulgaria.org, www.ria-studies.net, www.competitiveness.bg - 500 
BGL 
5) IME Mission – over 500 BGL 
 
If you are paying taxes in Bulgaria, 83% of the donation is tax-deductible. For more information please 
write to svetlak@ime.bg. 
 
 
Krassen Stanchev, Executive Director 
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